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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (1953, as amended) this civil appeal is 
within the jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court and was transferred to the Utah Court 
of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1953, as amended) on or about 
February 26, 2003. 
PARTIES 
1. Fox Construction, Inc. ("Fox") was at all times relevant a corporation with 
its principal place of business located in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah. Fox was 
licensed in the State of Utah as a general contractor with its primary business as a general 
contractor for commercial buildings. 
2. Gary Porter Construction d/b/a Porter & Sons ("Porter") was at all 
times relevant, a sole proprietorship, owned by Gary A. Porter ("Mr. G.A. Porter"), with 
its principal place of business located in Magna, Salt Lake County, Utah, and was a 
licensed subcontractor. 
3. National Surety Corporation ("National") was at all times relevant an 
Illinois corporation, and was authorized and licensed to conduct business within the State 
of Utah. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the district court erred in determining that Fox's Memorandum in 
Support of Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment fails to comply with 
Rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
2. Whether the district court erred in determining that Fox's Memorandum in 
Support of Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment fails to properly 
identify and set forth disputed issues of material facts. 
3. Whether the district court erred in evaluating the information and failed to 
give Fox Construction every reasonable inference that could be drawn from the material 
facts presented to the district court. 
4. Whether the district court erred by signing the June 2002 Order Granting 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment after a hearing on the motion. 
5. Whether the district court erred in determining that the Plaintiff was entitled 
to attorneys fees. 
6. Whether the district court erred by signing the December 2002 Order 
Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Attorneys' Fees after a hearing on the motion. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Fox entered into a general contract ("Contract") with the University of Utah 
("University") for the construction of a new Women's Gymnastics Training Facility on 
the University's campus in Salt Lake City, Utah ("Project"). Record at pages 667 - 668 
at paragraphs 1-2, pages 397 - 398 at paragraph 1, and pages 418 - 421. In 
connection with the Project, Fox, as principal, and National, as surety, issued a payment 
bond ("Payment Bond") for the benefit of persons supplying labor and material in 
connection with the Project, as required under the terms of the Fox / University Contract. 
Record at pages 667 - 668 at paragraphs 1-2, page 398 at paragraph 2, and page 
422. 
Fox entered into a written subcontract with Porter ("Subcontract"), under which 
Porter was to provide certain work related to the excavation and placement of soil 
materials in connection with the Project. Record at pages 667 - 668 at paragraphs 1 -
2, page 398 at paragraph 3, and pages 423 - 430. The Project was completed and the 
Parties attempted to reach an agreement as to the final payment to Porter. Fox claimed 
that Porter had been paid the full amount under the Subcontract, plus all additional work 
required by change orders, except for approximately $24,000.00. Record at page 592, 
In. 5 through page 593 In. 12. This amount was tendered to Porter by Fox, but the 
payment was rejected by Porter. Id. 
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Porter filed its complaint with the Third Judicial District Court on March 16, 2000 
("Complaint"). Record at pages 1-8. Porter then filed a Motion for Leave to File an 
Amended Complaint on or about January 12, 2001. Record at pages 32-33. The Court 
granted Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to file an Amended Complaint on or about February 
28, 2001. Record at pages 46-47. On or about March 14, 2001, Porter filed its 
Amended Complaint, which included an action against National, as the surety, upon the 
Payment Bond. Record at pages 53-59. On or about April 29, 2002, the district court 
held a hearing on National Surety Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, and Fox's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion. 
Record at page 663. The proposed Order was filed with the district court and Fox timely 
objected to the proposed Order. Record at pages 664-666. The Court signed Porter's 
proposed Order on June 6, 2002, ("June Order") awarding damages to the Plaintiff in the 
amount of $161,346.70. Record at pages 667-669. 
National and Porter could not agree on a proposed order granting National's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Consequently, the district court wrote and issued its own 
Memorandum Decision and Order on July 18, 2002, which granted National's Motion for 
Summary Judgment against Porter. Record at pages 791-798. 
As a result of its successful defense of the Payment Bond claim made by Porter, on 
July 31, 2002, National filed its Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees, along with a 
supporting Memorandum and an Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees. Record at pages 839-892. 
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Porter filed its Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs Against Fox Construction, Inc., its 
supporting Memorandum, and Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs on October 17, 
2002. Record at pages 1171-1194. 
The Court heard several of the pending motions on October 22, 2002. Record at 
page 1224. Judge Bohling filed the Order awarding Porter $41,775.66 in attorneys' fees 
on December 4, 2002. Fox filed its Notice of Appeal with the Third District Court on 
January 3, 2003. Record at pages 1232-1239. 
This case was assigned to the Court of Appeals under case number 20030071-CA. 
Porter filed its own appeal from the district court case which was assigned a case number 
of 20030272-SC. The two cases were consolidated, using case number 20030071-CA, on 
or about July 10, 2003. After an attempt to mediate this case, it is now ripe to move 
forward with the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The following facts taken from the district court's record are pertinent to the issues 
raised on appeal: 
1. Fox entered into a Contract with the University for the construction of the 
Project. Record at pages 667 - 668 at paragraphs 1-2 , pages 397 - 398 at paragraph 
1, and pages 418 - 421. 
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2. In connection with the Project, Fox, as principal, and National, as surety, 
issued a Payment Bond for the benefit of persons supplying labor and material in 
connection with the Project, as required under the terms of the Contract. Record at 
pages 667 - 668 at paragraphs 1 - 2, page 398 at paragraph 2, and page 422. 
3. Prior to entering into any contract with Fox, Mr. G.A. Porter received a set 
of plans and the specification that applied to the scope of work Porter intended to bid. 
Record at and page 590, In. 24 through page 591 In. 11. 
4. Fox entered into a Subcontract with Porter, under which Porter was to 
provide certain work related to the excavation and placement of soil materials in 
connection with the Project. Record at pages 667 - 668 at paragraphs 1-2, page 398 
at paragraph 3, and pages 423 - 430. 
5. Both Fox and Porter agree that the Subcontract contained at least one error. 
Section 02680 was included in the Subcontract when it was outside the scope of Porter's 
work. Record at pages 435, In. 18 through page 436, In. 14. 
6. In his deposition, Floyd Cox ("Mr. Cox") explained that Mr. G.A. Porter 
and the estimator for Fox, Jeff Wood ("Mr. Wood") had several conversations about the 
Subcontract regarding two issues; first, that there was a specification section left out of 
the subcontract (Section 02300); and two, that a specification was included in the 
subcontract that should not have been (Section 02680). Record at page 576, In. 2 
through page 578 In, 22. 
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7. Mr. Wood explained that Porter gave Fox a bid for all the civil work on the 
Project. Record at page 595, In. 25 through page 597 In. 24. 
8. Mr. Wood testified that there was a section of the specifications that was 
left out of the Subcontract by mistake. Record at page 598, In. 1 through In. 20. 
9. Mr. Cox explained that the section for gas piping was the section that 
should not have been included. Record at pages 667 - 668 at paragraphs 1-2 , page 
398 at paragraph 3, and pages 423 - 430. 
10. Mr. Cox went on to testify that section 2300 had been unintentionally left 
out of the Subcontract. Id. 
11. Mr. Cox believed that Porter's bid included section 2300 and Mr. Cox did 
not see an exclusion of section 2300 in Porter's bid. Id, 
12. Porter claimed to have performed "additional" work and sought 
"additional" compensation under section 2300 (earthwork), 02665 (waterlines, valves, 
and appurtenances), and 02711 (foundation drainage systems). Record at pages 526 -
532, paragraphs 13 - 35. 
13. Mr. Cox explained that Porter was asking for additional money for work 
and what Fox's position was concerning Porter's request. Once again, Mr. Cox explained 
that section 2300 was included in the Subcontract. Record at page 579, In. 12 through 
page 584 In. 14. 
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14. There were ongoing discussions between Porter and Fox about the 
Subcontract and section 2300. Id. 
15. The University took the position that Porter was responsible for section 
2300. Id. 
16. Addendum 4 was included in the Subcontract. That Addendum relates to 
section 2300. Record at page 585, In. 1 through page 586 In. 8. 
17. Mr. Cox was not aware of any requests by Fox for Porter to do work outside 
of the scope of work under the Subcontract Record at page 587, In. 7 through In. 23. 
18. Porter failed to follow the proper procedure for requesting any change 
orders. Id. 
19. Fox issued and delivered a check to Porter in the amount of approximately 
$24,000.00 as a complete and final payment for the work on the Subcontract in April 
1999. Mr. G.A. Porter rejected that check because he believed that the correct amount 
was between $34,000.00 to $37,000.00 in April 1999. Record at page 592, In. 5 
through page 593 In. 12. 
20. On or about April 23, 1999, Mr. G.A. Porter prepared and faxed a letter to 
Mr. Tom Christiansen ("Mr. Christiansen") of Campus Construction and Design at the 
University requesting the bond information on the Project. Record at page 139 In. 19 
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through page 140 In. 16, page 131 In. 13 through page 143 In. 17, pages 322 - 323 at 
paragraph 8, and page 592 In. 2 through page 593 In. 22. 
21. In Porter's fax letter to Mr. Christiansen, located at page 144 in the Record, 
Mr. G.A. Porter identifies the amount of money Porter was claiming was still owed as 
being approximately $40,000.00 on or about April 23, 1999. Record at page 144. 
22. In that same letter, Porter requests the "bonding information as soon as 
possible as we are filing suit immediately" from Mr. Christainsen. Mr. G.A. Porter also 
sent a copy of the fax letter to Fox and to Porter's counsel Brian Steffensen ("Mr. 
Steffensen"). Record at page 144. 
23. Mr. G. A. Porter did not go to the University personally to ask for a copy of 
the Payment Bond. Record at page 593 In. 23 through In. 25. 
24. In approximately May 1999, Mr. Mark A. Porter ("Mr. M.A. Porter"), Mr. 
G.A. Porter's son, discussed the need to get the Payment Bond information from either 
Fox or the University in order to make a claim against that Payment Bond with his father. 
Record at pages 325 - 326 at paragraphs 7-9 . 
25. Mr. G.A. Porter claimed that Porter's last date of work on the Project was 
May 16, 1999. Record at pages 321 - 322 at paragraph 3 and pages 324 - 325 at 
paragraph 3. Porter's last invoice to Fox on the Project is dated January 25, 1999. 
Record at pages 137 and 552. 
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26. In or about June 1999, counsel for Porter, Mr. Steffensen, tried to contact 
Mr. Christiansen concerning the Payment Bond on the Project. Record at pages 606 -
607 at paragraphs 2 -4 . 
27. Between April 23, 1999, the date of the faxed letter to Mr. Christiansen, and 
March 14, 2001, neither Porter nor Mr. G.A. Porter took any steps to commence an action 
upon the Payment Bond against any surety or assert any Payment Bond claim against any 
entity or individual. Record at pages 1 - 59. 
28. Porter filed its Complaint against Fox only, National was not named, nor 
was there a doe surety named, nor was there any mention of a Payment Bond claim 
against any person or entity in the Complaint. The Complaint included a claimed amount 
of in excess of $80,000.00. Record at pages 1 - 8. 
29. Fox filed its answer on or about April 14, 2000, ("Answer"). No surety was 
named in the Complaint. Record at pages 12 - 17. 
30. On or about June 29, 2000, Fox provided a copy of the Payment Bond to 
Mr. Steffensen, counsel for Porter. Record at page 335. 
31. After receiving the Payment Bond information from Fox in June 2000, 
Porter failed to take any action on that information until on or about January 12, 2001, 
when Porter filed its Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint and Memorandum 
in Support of Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint. Record at pages 32-41. 
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32. The district court allowed Porter to file its Amended Complaint on or about 
February 28, 2001. Record at pages 46 - 47. 
33. Porter filed its Amended Complaint on or about March 14, 2001 
("Amended Complaint"). Record at pages 53 - 59. 
34. This was the first time Porter made any claim against National and/or on 
any Payment Bond. Id. 
35. After service, National Answered Porter's Amended Compktint on or about 
July 10, 2001. Record at pages 96 -104. 
36. National filed its Motion for Summary Judgment with a supporting 
memorandum on or about December 4, 2001. Record at pages 114 - 162. 
37. Porter filed it Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant National Surety 
Corp.'s Motion for Summary Judgment on or about January 4, 2002. Record at pages 
238 - 338. 
38. National Surety Corp.'s Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment was filed by National on or about January 14, 2002. Record at 
pages 339 - 350. 
39. Porter filed Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment Against Fox 
Construction Company, accompanied by a memorandum on or about March 18, 2002. 
Record at pages 396 - 554. 
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40. Fox filed an Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment with a 
memorandum in support on or about April 8, 2002. Record at pages 563 - 603. 
41. Porter filed Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Record at pages 614 - 654. 
42. The district court signed and filed the Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment on or about June 6, 2002. Attached hereto as Exhibit A in the 
Addendum. Record at pages 667 - 669. 
43. The district court issued and signed its Memorandum Decision and Order 
granting National's motion for summary judgment on or about July 18, 2002. Record at 
pages 791 - 798. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. Porter moved for summary judgment and the district court failed to apply 
the proper standard. Summary judgment should only be granted after viewing the facts in 
the light most favorable to the non-moving party, that no disputed issues of material fact 
exist and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fox supported 
its objection to Porter motion for summary judgment by admitting and denying Porter's 
specific paragraphs set forth in its memorandum. Fox also provided specific citations to 
the record, which included affidavits and deposition testimony, for material issues of fact. 
There are disputes over what portion of the specifications for the Project were included or 
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excluded from Porter's Subcontract. Based on a determination of the specification in the 
Subcontract, the amount of money Fox owes Porter for its work within the scope of the 
Subcontract and amount owed, if anything, for any additional work performed by Porter. 
Fox citations to the record was adequate for the district court to deny Porter's motion for 
summary judgment. A trial should be had on the merits of the record of this case. 
2. Porter was awarded attorneys' fees based on the grant of summary 
judgment. Porter was not entitled to summary judgment on the record before the district 
court. Based on Porter not being entitled to summary judgment, attorneys' fees should 
not have been granted and should be denied pending an trial on the merits of the case. 
ARGUMENT 
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1. Standard of Review 
Before granting summary judgment, a court must find, after viewing the facts in 
the light most favorable to the non-moving party, that no disputed issues of material fact 
exist and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c), attached hereto as Exhibit B in the Addendum; Norman v. Anchor Development, 73 
P.3d 357 (Utah 2003). All reasonable inferences must be drawn from the facts and taken 
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Lovendahl v. Jordan School District, 
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63 P.3d 705 (Utah 2002) (citing Pigs Gun Club v. Sanpete County, 42 P.3d 379 (Utah 
2002)). 
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 
438 (Utah 1996). Furthermore, summary judgment is appropriate in at least two 
circumstances. First, if there could be no reasonable difference of opinion on a 
determination of the facts 'in the usual sense' or on an evaluative application of the legal 
standard to the facts; and second, when the facts are so tenuous, vague, or insufficiently 
established that determining causation becomes 'completely speculative.' Id. at 438. 
Fox, as the non-moving party, was entitled to every reasonable inference from all 
facts asserted by either party and including in the pleadings. The district court should 
have viewed all asserted facts in a light most favorable to Fox. The court failed to give 
Fox every inference and view the facts in Fox's favor for purposes of Porter's motion for 
summary judgment. 
The district court failed to view the facts identified in a light most favorable to 
Fox. It is undisputed that in April 1999, Porter claimed that it was owed somewhere 
between $34,000.00 and $37,000.00 instead of the $24,000.00 check offered by Fox. 
Record at page 592, In. 5 through page 593 In. 12. In Porter's faxed letter of April 23, 
14 
1999, to Mr. Christiansen, Mr. G.A. Porter identifies the amount of money Porter was still 
owed by Fox as approximately $40,000.00. Record at page 144. When Porter filed its 
Complaint in March 2000, it asserted a claim of in excess of $80,000.00. Ultimately, 
when Porter finally produced its asserted damage calculations, it claimed it was owed in 
excess of $161,000.00. The reasonable inference that can and should be drawn from 
these facts is there are material issues of disputed fact concerning the amount Fox owed 
Porter for the work performed on the Project. 
The determination of the correct amount to be paid, based on the amounts claimed 
by Fox and Porter as to be due and owing, cannot be decided as a matter of law, but 
rather, the facts and evidence must be reviewed, examined, and weighed. Pigs Gun Club, 
42 P.3d at 385 (Utah 2002); Gabriel v. Salt Lake City Corp. 34 P.3d 234, 237 (Utah App. 
2001); Trujillo v. Utah Dept of Tramp., 986 P.2d 752, 764 (Utah App. 1999); Kilpatrick 
v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1292 (Utah App. 1996). This weighing of the 
evidence is for the trier of fact and not the proper subject for summary judgment. The 
district court committed reversible error by granting summary judgment and removing the 
evaluation of the fact from the trier of fact. The district court's grant of summary 
judgment in the favor of Porter against Fox should be set aside and remanded for a trial 
on the issue of damages. 
It is admitted by both parties that there was at least one mistake in the Subcontract, 
which involved section 02680. Record at pages 435, In. 18 through page 436 In. 14; 
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pages 667 - 668 at paragraphs 1-2, page 398 at paragraph 3, and pages 423 - 430. 
This raises the question of whether the Subcontract has other errors. The Subcontract is 
admittedly ambiguous as to the sections that should be included. Fox asserted that as well 
as including a section that should not have been included, the Subcontract also mistakenly 
excluded at least one section. Record at page 598, In. 1 through In. 20; pages 667 -
668 at paragraphs 1-2 , page 398 at paragraph 3, and pages 423 - 430. Section 02300 
should have been included according to Fox. However, the district court failed to give 
Fox every reasonable inference that one section was added by mistake and another was 
left out by mistake. Another reasonable inference is that there was a typographical error 
in the Subcontract, which included adding 02680 and excluding 02300. The district court 
should have viewed the facts of a mistake in the Subcontract in a light most favorable to 
Fox and given Fox every reasonable inference that the typographical error involved two 
sections and not just one section. Most if not all of the damages alleged by Porter were 
for work it claimed it performed under section 02300, which it claimed was not part of its 
Subcontract with Fox. Porter sought to have the Subcontract found to be ambiguous as to 
section 02680 and then had parol evidence admitted to clarify the Subcontract, but then 
claimed the Subcontract was clear and unambiguous for all other purposes. Record at 
pages 526 - 532, paragraphs 13 - 35. The material issues of fact are what work was 
within Porter's scope of work under the Subcontract, what is the value of that work, and 
did Porter perform any "additional" outside of its Subcontract. Porter's grant of summary 
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judgment should be set aside and the trier of fact should be allowed the opportunity to 
review and evaluate these disputed material issues of fact. 
2. Whether the district court erred in determining that Fox's 
Memorandum in Support of Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment fails to comply with Rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration. 
Rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration requires that: 
Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that 
contains a verbatim restatement of each of the movant's statement of facts 
as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists followed by a concise 
statement of material facts which support the party's contention. Each 
disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and shall 
specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the opposing 
party relies. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement and 
properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed 
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically 
controverted by the opposing party's statement. 
Id. 
"Under Rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, all facts set 
forth in the movant's statement of facts are 'deemed admitted for the purpose of summary 
judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement.' Utah R. 
Jud. Admin. 4-501(2)(B) (2002)." Lovendahl, 63 P.3d at 717 (Utah 2002). Porter's 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment is located in the 
record at page 396 - 552. Porter's Statement of Undisputed Facts is located on pages 397 
- 409. Of the 65 specific paragraphs set forth therein, Fox denied 24 of them. Fox 
admitted and denied each paragraph of Porter's statement of facts, and then explained and 
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asserted facts, with citations to specific portions of the record, i.e. deposition testimony, 
which controverted Porter's facts and raised material issues of fact to be tried. Those 
paragraphs denied were: 
a. 6, 9 and 10 - All dealt with the Subcontract, the mistake in the Subcontract, 
and the sections Porter claimed were additional work. 
b. 20, 22, 35, 36, and 37 - Discussed change orders. 
c. 13, 15, 26, 30, 32, 38, 40, 42, 43, 50, 53, 55, 57, 62, 63, and 65 - Were 
discussions of invoices and the amount claimed. 
Each of these areas was addressed in Fox's Memorandum in Support of the Objection to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, which s located in the record at pages 563 
through 603. "Utah courts have repeatedly upheld the necessity of compliance with the 
Rules of Judicial Administration." Fennell v. Green, 11 P.3d 339, 342 (Utah App. 2003). 
The substance of Fox's objection met the requirements of Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration. Therefore, the district court should have considered the facts set 
forth in Fox' memorandum in determining whether there are material issues of fact to be 
determined by the trier of fact. 
3. Whether the district court erred in determining that Fox's 
Memorandum in Support of Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment fails to properly identify and set forth disputed 
issues of material facts. 
Fox used deposition testimony to support its issues of fact. There were two major 
disputes of fact, which should have precluded summary judgment. First, which sections 
of the Project were included in Porter's contract and second, how much was remaining to 
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be paid by Fox to Porter for work done on the Project, whether within the scope of the 
Subcontract or in addition to the Subcontract. 
Porter claimed that the Subcontract contained mistake and therefore, it should not 
be responsible for that section in the Subcontract. However, it then asserts that no further 
parol evidence should be used to correct the mistake of sections that were left out of the 
Subcontract. Porter claimed damages are more than doubles the amount of its 
Subcontract in additional charges on the Project. Fox asserted and set forth facts in its 
Memorandum in Support of the Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, 
which is located in the record at pages 563 through 603, that put at issue the facts outlined 
by Porter. The issues that are material and need to be evaluated and decided by the trier 
of fact are what sections were and were not included in the Subcontract, what work was 
in the scope of the Subcontract, and the appropriate amount to be paid by Fox to Porter 
for its work. 
As discussed earlier, Porter and Fox agree that a mistake was included in the 
Subcontract, which included section 02680. Parol evidence was used to establish the 
mistake. However, the same parol evidence was not considered to overcome that 
summary judgment motion filed by Porter as to other mistake in the Subcontract. At least 
one other section, section 02300, was left out of the Subcontract and was asserted by 
parol evidence. Fox should have had the facts asserted taken in a light most favorable to 
itself, being the non-moving party. Fox was denied this convention. Further, Fox is and 
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was entitled to all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from all of the facts set forth 
not only in Fox's memorandum, Porter's brief and evidence and all oleadings. Fox's 
evidence and memorandum are more than adequate to meet the standard of summary 
judgment. 
Porter's Subcontract amount for construction of the Project was $146,000.00. In 
April 1999, Porter claimed that is was still owed somewhere between $34,000.00 and 
$37,000.00. Fox believed that it only owed $24,000.00 for the balance of the Subcontract 
and any additional work performed by Porter. This in itself raises a material issue of fact. 
Porter, in its letter to the University in April 1999, claimed that it was owed 
approximately $40,000.00. Another amount was asserted in Porter's complaint of in 
excess of $80,000.00. Porter finally asserted a claim of $161,000.00. Fox presented 
these facts to the district court for its consideration in the motion for summary judgment. 
Fox gave the Court specific citations to the record that pointed out the dispute of facts, 
which included the amounts claimed by Porter. 
Fox's memorandum substantially complied with the Rule of Judicial 
Administration in the way it present the disputed facts. Fox is entitled to a trial on the 
issue of damages claimed by Porter. All reasonable inferences that can be drawn from 
this set of facts concerning the damages should be given to Fox. 
4. Whether the district court erred by signing the June 2002 Order 
Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment after a hearing on 
the motion. 
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The judgment prepared by Porter fails set forth adequate findings of fact and 
conclusions of law as to the reasoning of the district court in granting summary judgment 
to Porter. Judgment must contain findings of fact and conclusions of law in order to 
provide the appellate court the district court's reasoning. 
B. ATTORNEYS' FEES - Whether the district court erred in determining that 
the Plaintiff was entitled to and granted attorneys5 fees and. 
Porter's claim for attorneys' fees rests with the district court's determination that 
Porter was entitled to summary judgment. Fox presented evidence that demonstrated 
material issues of fact concerning the following issues: 
a. What was within the scope of the Subcontract for the Project? 
b. What was additional work to the Subcontract, if anything on the Project? 
c. How much was owed to Porter for work within the Subcontract? 
d. How much if anything was owed for any additional work, if any? 
Once the trier of fact is allowed to has made a finding on the material issues of fact, then 
an award of attorneys' fees should be entertained. There were and are material issues of 
fact properly present to the district court in this matter. Based on those material issues of 
fact that exist in this case, the district court should not have awarded attorneys' fees to 
Porter. Fox request that the attorneys' fee award be set aside. 
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CONCLUSION 
In view of the facts and argument set forth herein, Fox hereby requests that this 
Court issue an Order reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment and award 
of attorneys' fees to Porter and against Fox. Further, that Fox be allowed to present its 
case to the trier of fact on its merits, and for such other relief as the Court deems just and 
appropriate under the circumstances. 
Respectfully submitted this day of November 2003. 
BOSTWICK & PRICE, P.C. 
Jeffery R. Price 
Michael E. Bostwick 
Attorneys for Appellant / Cross-Appellee 
Fox Construction, Inc. 
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Certificate of Service tifi t 
I hereby certify that on this s day of November, 2003,1 caused to be a 
served two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant upon counsel 
for Appellee by placing same in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, first class 
postage prepaid, and correctly addressed as follows: 
Mr. Brian W. Steffensen 
STEFFENSEN LAW OFFICE 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
23 
ADDENDUM 
24 
EXHIBIT A 
25 
IMAGED 
BRIAN W. STEFFENSEN (#3092) 
DAMIAN E. DAVENPORT (#8169) 
Steffensen *Law •Office 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone (801) 485-3707 
Facsimile (801) 485-7140 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION II 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GARY PORTER CONSTRUCTION, 
dba PORTER & SONS, ORDER GRANTING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
Plaintiff, SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
vs. 
FOX CONSTRUCTION, INC., Civil No. 000902201 
& NATIONAL SURETY 
CORPORATION 
Defendant. Judge William B. Bohling 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendant Fox Construction, Inc., 
came regularly before the Honorable William B. Bohling on April 29,2002. Appearing for 
Plaintiff was Damian E. Davenport of Steffensen Law Office and for Defendant Fox 
Construction, Inc., Michael Bostwick. The Court, having heard oral argument and reviewed the 
Plaintiffs Motion and the Parties' Memoranda in Support and in Opposition hereby 
FINDS THAT: 
1. Defendants' Objection and Memorandum in Support of Objection to Plaintiffs Motion 
for Summary Judgment fails to comply with Rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Code of 
FILED OISTfJC? COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 0 6 
Deputy Clerk 
DATE 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OFJUl IDGMENTS 
Judicial Administration in that Defendants' Memorandum failed to properly identify and 
set forth disputed issues of material fact; 
2* Defendants' Memorandum does not dispute Plaintiffs Statement of Undisputed Facts; 
Based upon these Findings, the Court hereby CONCLUDES THAT Plaintiffs Statement 
of Undisputed Facts are deemed admitted for the purposes of the Motion; 
Based on said Findings and Conclusion, the Court hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND 
DECREES that Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment as against Defendant Fox 
Construction, Inc. is granted for the reasons set forth in Plaintiffs Memoranda in Support, and 
judgment is granted against Defendant Fox Construction and in favor of Plaintiff Gary Porter 
Construction in the principal amount of $161,346.70; the issues of attorney's fees and interest 
shall be reserved for later determination. 
DATED this _L£ day ofMay, 2002. 
The Honorable William B. BoMi^g^ 
Third District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ?6^ day of May, 2002,1 caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to be > Q mailed, postage prepaid; and/or hand-delivered by fax and/or 
by courier; addressed to the following: 
Jeffrey R. Price 
Michael Bostwick 
BABCOCK BOSTWICK SCOTT CRAWLEY & PRICE 
57 West South Temple, 8th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
^^enk^ 
EXHIBIT B 
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Rule 56 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 178 
liability against defaulting defendant, 8 mistake as to time or place of appearance, trial, 
A.L.R.3d 1070. or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L,R.3d 1255. 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus- Failure to give notice of application for de-
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d fault judgment where notice is required only by 
1272. custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383. 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam- pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
ages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. Default judgments against the United States 
Opening default or default judgment claimed under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
to have been obtained because of attorney's Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any par t 
thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, a t any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any par t thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a mat ter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court a t the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy 
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall 
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action 
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively tha t the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supple-
mented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in thi^ rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion tha t he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
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(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the 
court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are 
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount 
of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to 
incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney 
may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1997.) 
Compiler's Notes . -
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. 
- This rule is similar to Cross -Refe rences . — Contempt generally, 
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Affidavit. 
—Contents. 
—Corporation. 
—Experts. 
—Extension of time to submit. 
—Failure to submit. 
—Inconsistency with deposition. 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
Resting on pleadings. 
—Objection. 
—Sufficiency. 
Hearsay and opinion testimony. 
—Superseding pleadings. 
—Unpleaded defenses. 
—Verified pleading. 
—Waiver of right to contest. 
—When unavailable. 
Exclusive control of facts. 
—Who may make. 
Affirmative defense. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Appeal. 
—Adversely affected party. 
—Standard of review. 
Applicability. 
Attorney's fees. 
Availability of motion. 
Compliance with rule. 
Cross-motions. 
Damages. 
Discovery. 
Disputed facts. 
Evidence. 
—Admissions of plaintiff. 
—Facts considered. 
—Improper evidence. 
—Proof. 
—Unsupported motion. 
—Weight of testimony. 
Implicit rulings. 
Improper party plaintiff. 
Issue of fact. 
—Contract interpretation. 
—Corporate existence. 
—Deeds. 
—Lease as security. 
—Notice. 
—Wills. 
Judicial atti tude. 
Motion for new trial. 
Motion to dismiss. 
Motion to reconsider. 
Notice. 
—Provision not jurisdictional. 
—Waiver of defect. 
Procedural due process. 
Purpose. 
Scope. 
Summary judgment improper. 
—Damage to insured vehicle. 
—Dispersal of interest. 
—Findings by court. 
—Foreclosure of trust deeds. 
—Fraud or duress. 
—Guardianship. 
—Mortgage note. 
—Negligence. 
—Nonspecific denial of requests for admission. 
—Note. 
—Product liability action. 
—Recovery for goods and services. 
—Stock ownership. 
—Wrongful possession. 
Summary judgment proper. 
—Breach of fiduciary duty. 
—Contract action. 
Waiver of claims. 
—Contract terms. 
—Deceit. 
—Defamation. 
—Duty of care. 
—Employee status. 
—Federal law. 
—Fraud. 
—Judicial immunity. 
—Jurisdiction. 
—Lease action. 
—Misrepresentation. 
—Negligence. 
—Proximate cause. 
—Res ipsa loquitur. 
Time for motion. 
Written s tatement of grounds. 
Cited. 
Affidavit. 
—Contents . 
Specific facts are required to show whether 
there is genuine issue for trial. Reagan Outdoor 
Adv., Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 R2d 776 (Utah 
1984). 
When a motion for summary judgment is 
made under this rule, the affidavit of an ad-
verse party must contain specific evidentiary 
facts showing tha t there is a genuine issue for 
trial. Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747 
(Utah 1985). 
